Friday, August 29, 2014

Handing Out Money

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill, 2009), which was translated and republished in Chinese (2014). He is researching a book about Ben Bernanke. He writes a blog at www.AuContrarian.com.


To be clear on the main point of "The Killing Fields": The world's central banks have been working for well over a year on handing out money to the people. Their intention is to avoid the intermediate step of operating through commercial banks. The Federal Reserve, for example, generates (through electronic dollar credits to the banks) "money" (as the word is used today) in operations between the New York Fed and the primary dealers. After these electronic dollars are credited to banks, the money does not always get lent out or go where the central banks would like. The central banks are trying to get legislation that will permit direct currency transfers to the people. 

Thursday, August 28, 2014

The Killing Fields

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill, 2009), which was translated and republished in Chinese (2014). He is researching a book about Ben Bernanke. He writes a blog at www.AuContrarian.com.


            The house organ for the Council of Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, has published its final solution under the title: "Print Less and Transfer More: Why Central Banks Should Give Money directly to the People."  Written under the names Mark Blyth and Eric Lonergan, but trumpeting the establishment voice of, say, Martin Wolf, they state: "It's well past time, then, for U.S. policymakers - as well as their counterparts in other developed countries -  to consider a version of Friedman's helicopter drops.... Many in the private sector don't want to take out any more loans; they believe their debt levels are already too high. That's especially bad news for central bankers: when households and businesses refuse to rapidly increase their borrowing, monetary policy can't do much to increase their spending.... Governments must do better. Rather than trying to spur private-sector spending through asset purchases or interest-rate changes, central banks, such as the Fed, should hand consumers cash directly.... The transfers wouldn't cause damaging inflation, and few doubt that they would work. The only real question is why no government has tried them."

           This is a fairly standard view among celebrity economists these days, possibly worth commemorating since the CFR has joined the deluge, although, there are adult members of the CFR who should denounce this position. Money printing by Bernanke and kin has been ad hoc from the beginning, as the ecstatic and clairvoyant B├╝rgermeisteramt made clear when ZIRP besotted the world (see: "Meet Your Investment Manager").


            That "few doubt [handing out money] would work" is true within academia and has-been institutions. History has recorded the contrary. Chase van der Roehr, writing in the August 19, 2014, edition of Bloomberg Briefs, noted "it now takes $37,403 added to the Fed's balance sheet to stimulate the creation of a new job. That number stood at $7,600 in August 2008 and has deteriorated steadily ever since."

            The median new job pays much less, so the $37,403-to-1 ratio, after being adjusted for a constant quality, is infinite. "[F]ew doubt that they would work" since those polled are entirely ignorant of all but each others' opinions.

            Printing money has never worked, the grander the scale the worse the calamity. The French state in 1790 was falling deeper into debt. The Assembly first confiscated Church property, found itself deeper in debt, authorized a 400 million assignat print, with a pledge that no more currency would be issued. The poor grew poorer, starved, and cries of "We need more money!" elicited another 800 million assignats. This ended in collapse, including the redemptive pleasure of Assemblymen rolled on tumbrels through the streets of Paris to their end.

            Germany in the early 1920s suffered central banker Rudolf Haverstein's delusion. As jobs disappeared along with food, Haverstein worked the presses to death. (Ludwig von Mises recalled hearing "the heavy drone of the Austrian Bank's printing presses which were running incessantly day and night to produce new bank notes in Vienna." Austria was following Germany's lead; a temptation it still suffered from in the 1930s.)

The historian Alan Bullock wrote: "[The inflation] had the effect, which is the unique quality of economic catastrophe, of reaching down and touching every single member of the community in a way in which no political event can. The savings of the middle classes and working classes were wiped out at a single blow with a ruthlessness which no revolution could ever equal..."

Today, Japan's fascinating yen-printing campaign imitates the same blue print. It is ending with the people unable to pay for food; or much else; Nissan, Toyota, and Honda moving to Mexico; so eliciting hysterical government responses. Bloomberg reporter Katsuyo Kuwako captured the moment in "Japanese Women Armed with Chainsaws Head to the Hills under Abe's Plan." Kuwako reported Comrade "Junko Otsuka quit her job in Tokyo and headed for the woods, swapping a computer for a bush cutter and her air-conditioned office for the side of a mountain. She was part of a new wave of women taking forestry jobs, the result of economic, social and environmental policies sprouting in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Japan. Otsuka... said she's fine with the 20 percent pay cut to be the first female logger at Tokyo Chainsaws.... [Abe] set a goal of... revitalizing regional economies and enhancing women's roles."
 
Adam Posen -
Heavyweight Inflationist
  
Japanese economic policy is dictated from the United States. Maybe it should not be a surprise to read Junko's elation at a 20% pay cut to "[enhance] women's roles." After all, somehow the Conference Board was able to report U.S. consumer confidence is at a seven-year-high on August 26, 2014. Adam Posen, quad-author along with Ben S. Bernanke of Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience, is truly a man of the moment as money experiments go extraterrestrial. Posen was quoted in "We Are All Lab Rats Now" featured in "May 2014: Crematorium" (earlier visage and caption thrown in for free). Lord Circumference harassed Financial Times readers in March with his Trotskyite reforms in Japan:  "Increasing female labour force participation is the right priority for structural reform. At least three million women who could work are neither in employment nor looking for a job. A few million more are squandering their capabilities in limited roles...." 
         
Comrade Lara - Not so fine with Lenin's 20 percent cut.

Repeating the conclusion of "Meet Your Investment Manager," this crowd has so bungled every decision the possibility rises that a run-for-the-exits will be halted by markets being closed. If so, that would be trial-and-error too, as we saw in 2008. It is important to develop a strategy that can respond as circumstances change to preserve assets. 

Wednesday, August 20, 2014

Meet Your Investment Manager

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill, 2009), which was translated and republished in Chinese (2014). He is researching a book about Ben Bernanke. He writes a blog at www.AuContrarian.com.


         There is little else left in the asset-pricing world than central bankers. The redoubtable Ben Hunt, chief risk officer at Salient investment managers ($20 billion under management), wrote on David Stockman's Contra Corner: "I've spent the past few weeks meeting Salient clients and partners across the country.... When I had conversations [with clients and partners] six months ago, I would get a fair amount of resistance to the notion that narratives dominate markets and that we're in an Emperor's New Clothes world. Today, everyone believes that market price levels are largely driven by monetary policy and that we are being played by politicians and central bankers using their words for effect rather than direct communication. No one requires convincing that markets are unsupported by real world economic activity. Everyone believes that this will all end badly, and the only real question is when."

This might be referred to as "End-of the-Cycle Mispricing, but, what a cycle! End-of-the-Cycle Mispricing discussed the derangement of prices, in all assets. Money managers as a whole have not considered protection for their funds when everyone runs for the door at once. The "catastrophic bond" paper linked to the discussion was specific, but, there are plenty of avenues to construct such protection.

What follows is a transcription of just how ignorant, moreover, willingly ignorant, and, it may be, enthusiastically ignorant, was the Bernanke Fed when it decided that holding interest rates at zero percent would be its policy. Before plunging through the looking glass, here is the conclusion: If ever there was a time to protect one's assets from further FOMC derangement, this is it. If you do not (and cannot) design a Personal Protection Plan, buy cash, gold nuggets, and silver eagles. 

Reading the transcript from the December 15-16, 2008, FOMC meeting, it is clear the Federal Open Market Committee was embarking on its zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP - which is still all we've got) as an experiment.

By way of background, the FOMC had cut the Fed funds rate cut from 5.25% on June 29, 2006 to 1.00% on October 29, 2008. Most of reduction had been over the previous few months as the pillars fell: Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. The last two converted to commercial banks and received government protection as well as deposit-taking authorization.

The December meeting addressed whether the funds rate should be cut to zero (ZIRP), or, to some halfway house. As has been true throughout Bernanke's chairmanship, the 284-page debate could only have been held in the Eccles Building. The funds rate had been trading below the declared rate for a couple of months. One can only imagine the ecstasy at the Fed on December 12, 2008, when the funds rate traded at 0.00%: the "zero-bound." This had been Professor Bernanke's ad pitch since the early 1990s.

Two members of the Committee stand out as particularly itchy to get on with it, Chairman Bernanke and (then) San Francisco Federal Reserve President Janet Yellen. Bernanke broke with precedent by speaking first. Normally, the Chairman opens with a few remarks but waits until all FOMC members (plus non-voting regional presidents) have voiced their opinions before holding forth.

            In synopsis, there was no debate, not because fed funds were trading at zero already. The FOMC was discussing Fed policy. In Bernanke's words: "[W]e are at a historic juncture.... [o]f necessity, moving towards new approaches.... [T]his is a work in progress." One might wonder if the Fed chairman had created the "necessity" so that he could breathlessly declare this "historic juncture," and he could experiment with his textbook diagrams: His "work in progress."

            Through his great experiment, Bernanke seems not to have blanched at heaving new innovations from the Eccles Building without knowing what might follow. At the October 28-29, FOMC meeting, about three weeks after the Fed first paid banks interest on their reserves, Federal Reserve Governor Elizabeth Duke reported: "I asked [the banks] specifically this question about interest rates on reserves, and every single one of them said: 'We haven't had time to even focus on it. We don't even know what's going on with that.'" Bernanke responded: "Learning theory in practice. Thank you very much."

            You may remember the many borrowing windows opened by the Fed in 2008. The transcript shows there was little coherence to these conduits. At the December meeting, Bernanke said: "We have adopted a series of programs, all of which involve some type of lending or asset purchase.... [of] which even I do not know all of the acronyms anymore." Anymore? A viewer of Bernanke during Senate testimony would question whether he knew what they did to begin with.

St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard lamented later in the same meeting: "I would like to see us work harder, maybe much harder, on the metrics for success of these facilities [the various borrowing windows - FJS] and perhaps rework or discontinue facilities that may not be meeting expectations.... Frankly, I am not sure in all cases what the purpose of the programs is. We have a lot of them out there. We have ideas. We should quantify that. We should be assessing, and then we should turn around and say, 'This one is working. This one is not working.' I would like to see a lot more in that direction. I understand that we haven't done it so far...." The Bernanke Fed tendency might be summed: "Assess the facilities? Why bother? Open another one."

Everyone had their say at the December meeting, During the Greenspan and Bernanke pontificates, members who disagreed with the FOMC vote were talking to a wall. In the meeting under discussion, the topic was whether to confiscate the People's interest rates (and interest earnings) or not.

The chairman opened: "I'd like to ask your indulgence. There's an awful lot here, and I'd like to go first this time and try to clear out some underbrush and to lay down some issues in the hope that it will perhaps focus our discussion a bit more." The message is unmistakable: the FOMC would vote to ZIRP the American people.

There were several members who contested ZIRP. The FOMC member chosen for exposition here is St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard. This choice is two-fold. His concerns were worries a college professor might express, one who talked about - in fact, Bernanke hid behind - models, the "literature," and theory. Bullard has also been selected since he holds the bone fides Bernanke cherishes. Bullard's papers have been published in the American Economic Review, Journal of Monetary Economics, Macroeconomic Dynamics, and Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.
The St. Louis Fed president explained his demurral: "I do not find the Reifschneider-Williams paper, which I know carries some weight around here, very compelling, so let me give the brief reasons behind that. For one thing, you are taking a model and you are extrapolating far outside the experience on which the model is based. That might be a first pass, but that is probably not a good way to make policy, and I wouldn't base policy on something like that."

What (you may not have the slightest interest in knowing), is the Reifschneider-Williams paper? David Reifschneider and John C. Williams wrote a paper in 2000, "Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era." The paper describes "limits to policy accommodation attributable to the lower bound on rates." The person who described the paper in that phrase will be identified later, though anyone who's been around the past few years probably has a hunch.

The second of Bullard's concerns: "There are also important nonlinearities. This whole debate is about nonlinearities as you get to the zero bound, and in my view, they are not taken into account appropriately in this analysis. You have households and businesses that are going to understand very well that there is a zero bound. It has been widely discussed for the past year. They are going to take this into account when they are making their decisions, so you have to incorporate that into the analysis. That is a tall order-there are papers around that try to do that, and many other assumptions have to go into that."

The fellow who has been widely published on macroeconomic matters went on: "The third thing I think is important is that, in other contexts, gradualism or policy inertia is actually celebrated as an important part of a successful, optimal monetary policy. Mike Woodford, in particular, has papers on optimal monetary policy inertia, and many others have worked on it. In those papers, it is all about making your actions gradual and making sure that they convey some benefit to the equilibrium that you will get.

"All of a sudden, in this particular analysis, when you are facing a zero bound, that [taking a gradual, deliberate approach towards a zero percent interest rate - FJS] goes out the window, and I don't think that it is taken into account appropriately in the analysis.

"Also, it is thrown out the window exactly at a time when you might think that the inertia and the gradualism are most important, which would be in time of crisis when you want to steer the ship in a steady way." Yes, you might think.

Bullard had plenty more to say at the December 2008 meeting. Others who zapped ZIRP were Dallas Federal Reserve President Richard Fisher, Philadelphia President Charles Plosser, and Richmond President Jeffrey Lacker. One of Plosser's many admonitions: "We still do not understand why having interest rates on reserves isn't working to keep the funds rate at its target, and there may well be unintended consequences of moving our target to zero, beyond those well articulated in the Board's staff notes." Plosser's audience had no interest in whether FOMC steps actually worked or not. Bernanke had already said, regarding Governor Duke's lack of knowledge by the banks: "Learning theory in practice. Thank you very much."

I could probably list another hundred - certainly at least fifty - other objections stated at that meeting against establishing a zero-interest rate policy. Today, at least a thousand problems created by ZIRP are throttling us.

There is not the slightest chance Chairman Yellen will lift rates. The market will do that. Yellen, then San Francisco Federal Reserve President, did not acknowledge any reason to deliberate over ZIRP: "I see few advantages to gradualism, and certainly whenever we approach the zero bound, I think the funds rate target should be quickly reduced toward zero. [Outside of the Eccles Building, it was 0.00% - FJS] As to the level of the lower bound, my default position is that we should move the target funds rate all the way to zero because that would provide the most macroeconomic stimulus."  From current speeches, it is obvious she still believes that final sentence.

            The answer to the pop quiz: Who said the Reifschneider-Williams paper describes "limits to policy accommodation attributable to the lower bound on rates?" Nobody. That is footnote number 24 to Ben S. Bernanke's speech on August 31, 2012, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, "Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis." He committed murder in his footnotes to speeches. The claim to which he attached the footnote is as improbable as he is, and Bernanke is abusing the paper (as Bullard warned the FOMC) by extrapolating its conclusions to a situation (ZIRP) which is "far outside the experience on which the model is based" to bilge his way past the crowd at Jackson Hole. That is never hard to do. Some investment manager.
           
            Given the FOMC's ad lib policymaking, it is difficult to believe they have any idea what to do when - yes, when - the run on the markets start, other than to close markets. This is the time to construct an avenue of personal protection.

  

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

End-of-the-Cycle Mispricing

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill, 2009), which was translated and republished in Chinese (2014). He is researching a book about Ben Bernanke. He writes a blog at www.AuContrarian.com.

The attachment is to a paper Joe Calandro and I wrote for the November 2013 Gloom, Doom & Boom Report.  "CatastropheInsured: Cat Bonds," discusses the money-making potential of a specific cat(astrophe) bond strategy. Such an investment appeals to a small audience but the characteristics apply broadly.

            "What is the price?" should be fundamental to investment decisions. We know that is often not the case. A fund manager who invests in small-cap stocks must buy small-cap stocks. Managers are usually permitted the alternative of holding money in cash, but are wary of doing so. Relative performance is the manager's calling.

            The qualification (above) of a "specific" cat bond strategy is in response to the question: "What is the price?" The answer, at times: "Not what it is should be." Catastrophe insurance is being mispriced, which is not a surprise in the current environment when anything goes. In "soft" markets, insurers cover catastrophe-exposed insurance polices at too low a price. In the cat bond area, there is too little on-the-ground understanding of the insurers' property and financial exposures when a catastrophe hits. Even more so, since catastrophes can come in pairs (e.g., hurricanes and financial panics).

            After selling property insurance to businesses or homeowners (for instance), insurers (or, their investment bankers) bundle the policies into cat bonds as a form of reinsurance. This is meant to be similar to the process of securitizing mortgages or auto loans. Cat bonds have been sold for quite awhile, but it is only in the past couple of years that volume has skyrocketed. We know what happened when mortgage-backed securities boomed up until 2007. In general, investment mangers did not study the quality of the mortgages or the composition of the securities. Those who did crunch the numbers either stayed away or employed strategies to short the securities.

            In defense of the investment managers who did not understand the mortgage securities, to do so required a tremendous amount of work and hiring specialists. For the most part, investors relied on the resourceful credit agencies that stamped sub-prime securities as AAA. So too, with cat bonds, where there is no substitute for exposure identification, cycle management, and contract documentation.

            We are seeing a replay of 2007 across the investment spectrum. It is not a surprise that a burgeoning class of securitized liabilities has been bought by mutual funds and hedge funds. They zip cat bonds through their bond models and buy.

            It will be interesting to see how this turns out.*

*In the spirit, if not the orbit, of Arthur Balfour, who, when signing the so-called Balfour Declaration of 1917, promising a homeland in Palestine for the Jews, commented: "I have no idea what the result will be, but I am certain that it will lead to a very interesting situation."
  

Saturday, July 26, 2014

No Decency

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill, 2009), which was translated and republished in Chinese (2014). He is researching a book about Ben Bernanke. He writes a blog at www.AuContrarian.com.


MarketWatch should be ashamed of itself. In a July 24, 2014, interview, Mephistopheles was treated with the respect due a senior statesman, when he should have been asked: "Have you no sense of decency sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?"

            The answer, of course, is "no," though Greenspan does not understand that.

            Left on our own, some comments MarketWatch should have mutilated. Greenspan is quoted in italics:

"[N] o central bank can be oblivious to what is happening, not only in credit markets, which is, of course, the Fed's fundamental mandate...."

Greenspan did not state just what the Fed's mandate concerning credit might be. Of course, he wanted to leave MarketWatch readers with the impression that prudence is paramount, and that "The Greatest Central Banker who Ever Lived" (Alan Blinder, Princeton economics professor; Federal Reserve, rag-sheet propagandist), established the industry standard. From the time Greenspan was named Federal Reserve chairman until he left office, the nation's debt rose from $10.8 billion to $41.0 billion. It had risen to a level at which it was unserviceable.

"Without asset-market surveillance, you do not have an integrated view of how the economy works."

Chairman Greenspan would not allow the FOMC to discuss asset prices. By the mid- to late-1990s, there were many FOMC members who raised the topic of runaway asset prices, including stocks, houses, booming housing debt that was boosting those prices, and out-of-control consumer spending. The most persistent critic was Jerry Jordan, president of the Cleveland Fed.

At the December 16, 1997 FOMC meeting, Jordan said: "Some Board members referred earlier to the dichotomy between the prices of services and the price of goods. That clearly is the case, but the notion of dichotomy also has to be applied in the case of asset prices....I was reading some material about the operations of the FOMC in the early 1930s." That material has been annihilated by the so-called academics.

Jordan concluded, the Fed's myopic concentration in the 1920s on a steady price level of goods and services was wrong: "I think it's a useful reminder of what can go wrong if we are too narrow in thinking about the words 'inflation' and 'deflation'....What do we mean by the word 'inflation?' Clearly, it cannot refer simply to the current price of goods..."

Greenspan ignored Jordan's observation. Later in the meeting, Greenspan thought that "[s]omething very different is happening.... [W]e keep getting reams of ever lower CPI readings that seem outrageous in the context of clearly accelerating wages and an ever-tighter labor market...I was startled by this morning's CPI report. We cannot keep getting such numbers and continue to say that inflation is about to rise." Jordan had just told Greenspan that inflation was out of control: it was Microsoft rather than Mayonnaise that was inflating.

"How to respond to asset-price change is a legitimate issue. But not to monitor it, I think, is clearly a mistake."

            In 1998, Chairman Greenspan told the FOMC, in effect, there would be no further discussion about rising asset prices. He declared asset prices could no longer be mentioned at meetings: "I have concluded that in the broader sense we have to stay with our fundamental central bank goal, namely to stabilize product price levels."

In fact, excesses outside the Eccles Building were not dissimilar to those today. Jerry Jordan, at a 1998 FOMC meeting: "Bankers complain a lot that pension funds and insurance companies are doing deals that no sensible banker would be willing to consider."

Greenspan's rationale was nonsense: "I do know that the presumption we have discussed in the last year or so that we can effectively manage a bubble is probably based on a lack of humility. As I've said before, a bubble is perceivable only in retrospect." My italics.

Greenspan had never said "a bubble is only", etc., anywhere, to any audience. His declaration was accepted immediately. The mental incapacity of this generation of economists is evident in the fact this position would become known as the "Greenspan Doctrine," and accepted by central banks, academic economists, and the media.
        Okay, let's end with a laugh. Alan Greenspan in a commencement address (institution withheld to spare humiliation) on May 15, 2005: "I do not deny that many appear to have succeeded in a material way by cutting corners and manipulating associates, both in their professional and personal lives. But material success is possible in this world, and far more satisfying, when it comes without exploiting others. The true measure of a career is to be content, even proud, that you succeeded through your own endeavors without leaving a trail of casualties in your wake."

Thursday, July 24, 2014

Where to Invest: With Macroinvestors or Macroeconomists?

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill, 2009), which was translated and republished in Chinese (2014). He is researching a book about Ben Bernanke. He writes a blog at www.AuContrarian.com.

            Stanley Druckenmiller, the justly renowned investor, spoke at the Delivering Alpha conference on Wednesday, July 16, 2014. Quoting Druckenmiller: "As a macro investor, my job for 30 years was to anticipate changes in the economic trends that were not expected by others - and therefore not yet reflected in securities prices. I certainly made my share of mistakes over the years, but I was fortunate enough to make outsized gains a number of times when we had different views from various central banks."

            Druckenmiller went on to discuss, among much else that deserves reading, how the Fed's emergency 1.0% fed funds rate in 2003-2004 defied conditions observed by him and his colleagues at Duquesne Capital. Where was the emergency? In short: "[W]e were confident the Fed was making a mistake, but we were much less confident in how it would manifest itself. However, our assessment by mid-2005 that the Fed was fueling an unsustainable housing Bubble, with dire repercussions for the greater economy, allowed our investors to profit handsomely as the financial crisis unfolded."

            Today, Federal Reserve Chairman Janet Yellen sounds more preposterous every time she opens her mouth. Last week, maybe it was two weeks ago, she offered America a sector analysis, proposing that small-cap and biotech stocks look overpriced. A few days later, ECB President Mario Draghi offered his opinion of no widespread asset bubbles, although some markets looked "frothy."

            It has been less than a decade since Fed chairman Greenspan declared there was no housing bubble, though he saw signs of "froth." His weasel act warranted derision, which is just what it received, such as in the Economist's headline: "Frenzied Froth" (May 28, 2005). Draghi is acclaimed for his well-tailored suits but they stink of old mothballs. He's a botoxed Greenspan.

            The two of them - that would be Yellen and Draghi - have decided to let markets take their course, now that the Fed and ECB have used every possible mechanism to create mispricings in all markets. They will administer regulatory measures, if necessary.

            The only such declaration of any use would be to administer the two of them, along with their supercilious staffs, out of existence. Instead, the average person who reads newspapers that include even a moderate degree of financial reporting knows multiple crashes are building.

The all-star break results are in. That is, the announcements of how first-half 2014 security issues compare to earlier years. We can congratulate ourselves. Never before has the world shown such indulgence, intemperateness, and unconscionable underwriting as in 2014.

"Megadeals... helped push the number of debt sales by highly rated companies in the U.S. to record levels in the first half of the year. These companies sold about $642 billion of debt." That "outstrips the previous record set in 2009, when $612 billion of bonds was sold..." (Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2014) Aside from the probable default rate (where are you now, TXU?), megadeals are no friend to the workers.


"As investors scour the landscape for income, the first half of the year saw record amounts of new corporate bond issuance as well as record issuance of collateralized loan obligations. CLOs are securitized vehicles that invest in bank loans made to junk-rated companies, first pooling the loans and then dividing them into tranches to be sold to investors at varying levels of income and risk.... The $58 billion of CLO issuance in the first half of this year puts 2014 on pace to top $100 billion and break the previous single-year issuance record...set in 2007." (Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2014) Pension plans and insurance companies are large buyers of such attempts to increase yield; an attempt to reinstitute the yield confiscated by the same central banks that have now declared their forbearance in monitoring default-prone issues.

Doug Noland, manager of the Prudent Bear Fund, in his Credit Bubble Bulletin, written on July 11, 2014, analyzed the seven-year itch, under the appropriate title: "2014 vs. 2007":

"From my perspective, 2014 and 2007 share troubling similarities. Both periods feature overheated securities markets, replete with the rapid issuance of securities at inflated valuations. Both are characterized by investor exuberance in the face of deteriorating fundamentals - and in both cases central bank policymaking was fundamental to heavily distorted market risk perceptions. It's no coincidence that today's overheated backdrop - record securities issuance and meager risk premiums/record high prices - readily garner statistical comparison to 2007.

"This year's booming M&A market has posted the strongest activity since 2007. Second quarter global M&A volume of $1.06 trillion was up 72% from the year ago period. Here at home, M&A more than doubled year-on-year to $473 billion, pushing record first-half volume to $749 billion. The proliferation of deals was fueled by the loosest credit conditions in years. First-half global corporate bond issuance hit an all-time high $2.29 trillion. A record $286 billion of junk bonds were issued globally, as average junk yields traded to the lowest level ever. At $642 billion, first-half U.S. investment-grade company bond sales easily posted an all-time high. The first six months of 2014 also saw record issuance of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). A record number of global IPOs were sold in the first half, with $90.6 billion of offerings 54% above comparable 2013. Led by technology and biotechnology issues, U.S. IPO sales enjoyed the strongest first-half since the height of the technology bubble back in 2000. According to Dealogic, year-to-date total global sales of corporate stock and equity-linked securities reached an unmatched $510 billion, outpacing 2007's record pace."

It is certain such frivolities are "not yet reflected in securities prices."
 
 

Monday, July 14, 2014

The Old Regime and the French Revolution

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill, 2009), which was translated and republished in Chinese (2014). He is researching a book about Ben Bernanke.


            On this 225th anniversary of liberté, égalit́́e, and fraternité, Alexis de Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution (L'Ancien régime et la revolution), published in 1856, is, if not as invigorating as La Marseillaise, a worthy reflection upon Bastille Day. Following are some excerpts from Chapter eight, which carries the subtitle: "How, given the facts set forth in the preceding chapters, the Revolution was a foregone conclusion":

            My object in this final chapter is to bring together some of those aspects of the old régime which were depicted piecemeal in the foregoing pages and to show how the Revolution was their natural, indeed inevitable, outcome.

            When we remember it was in France that the feudal system, while retaining the characteristics which made it so irksome to, and much resented by, the masses, had most completely discarded all that could benefit or protect them, we may feel less surprise at the fact that France was the place of origin of the revolt destined so violently to sweep away the last vestiges of that ancient European institution.

            Similarly, if we observe how the nobility after having lost their political rights and ceased, to a greater extent than in any other land of feudal Europe, to act as leaders of the people had nevertheless not only retained but greatly increased their fiscal immunities and the advantages accruing to them individually; and if we also note how, while ceasing to be a ruling class, they had remained a privileged, closed group, less and less (as I have pointed out) an aristocracy and more and more a caste - if we bear these facts in mind, it is easy to see why the privileges enjoyed by this small section of the community seemed so unwarranted and so odious to the French people and why they developed that intense jealousy of the "upper class" which rankles still today.

            Finally, when we remember that the nobility had deliberately cut itself off both from the middle class and from the peasantry (whose former affection it had alienated) and had thus become a foreign body in the State: ostensibly the high command of a great army, but actually a corps of officers without troops to follow them - when we keep this in mind, we can easily see why the French nobility, after having so far weathered every storm, was stricken down in a single night.

            I have shown how the monarchical government, after abolishing provincial independence and replacing local authorities by its nominees in three quarters of the country, had brought under its direct management all public business, even the most trivial. I have also shown how, owing to the centralization of power, Paris, which had until now been merely the capital city, had come to dominate France - or, rather, to embody in itself the whole kingdom. These two circumstance, peculiar to France, suffice to explain why it was that an uprising of the people could overwhelm so abruptly and decisively a monarchy that for so many centuries had successfully withstood so many onslaughts and, on the eve of the downfall, seemed inexpugnable, even to the men who were about to destroy it....

            Since no free institutions and, as a result, no experienced and political parties existed any longer in France, and since in the absence of any political groups of this sort the guidance of public opinion, when its first stirrings made themselves felt, came entirely into the hands of the philosophers, that is to say, the intellectuals, it was only to be expected that the directives of the Revolution should take the form of abstract principles, highly generalized theories, and that political realities would be largely overlooked. Thus, instead of attacking only such laws as seemed objectionable, the idea developed that all laws indiscriminately must be abolished and a wholly new system of government, sponsored by these writers, should replace the ancient French constitution.

            Moreover, since the Church was so closely bound up with the ancient institutions now to be swept away, it was inevitable that the Revolution, in overthrowing the civil power, should assail the established revolution. As a result, the leaders of the movement, shaking off the controls that religion, law, and custom once had exercised, gave free reign to imagination and indulged in acts of outrageousness that took the whole world by surprise. Nevertheless, anyone who had closely studied the condition of the country at the time might well have guessed that there was no enormity, no form of violence from which these men would shrink....

            But when the virile generation which had launched the Revolution had perished or (as usually befalls a generation engaging in such ventures) its first fine energy had dwindled; and when, as was to be expected after a spell of anarchy and "popular" dictatorship, the ideal of freedom had lost much of its appeal and the nation, at a loss where to turn, began to cast about for a master - under these circumstances the stage was set for a return to one-man government....