Frederick
J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan
Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession (McGraw-Hill,
2009) and "The Coming Collapse of the
Municipal Bond Market" (Aucontrarian.com, 2009)
Advocates for Federal Reserve disclosure harp on the
five-year wait for FOMC transcripts. The reasoning goes that institutions in a
democracy should be more democratic: let the people know what the Fed plots
behind closed doors. The question arises: to what end?
The 2008 transcripts were released in late-February. Most media operations published stories about the Fed's absent-minded professors who missed the importance of failing financial institutions during 2008. This was not news. That has been described over the past five years, among other places, in Panderer to Power. The release, however, was an opportunity to remind investors, retirees, florists, and students receiving government financing of their precarious state.
Now, the story of the 2008 transcripts has died, without
much in the way of help to the bewildered. Granted, bewilderment is the general
state of affairs today, whether at the FOMC, among the media, the people, and
those who cannot understand how such as state-of-affairs continues.
Nevertheless, the opportunity exists to elevate comprehension. This was the goal
in"Those FOMC Transcripts: Watch
Out Below," (February 26, 2014). The effort continues, here, to
describe how the whirlwind of noise escaping the Eccles Building reflected
through the self-serving interpretations of the Wall Street experts is so
perilous.
From the March 3, 2014, King Report:
"Due to quivering Fed officials' incessant assertions that the Fed would halt or
even reverse QE tapering if economic conditions warrant, an increasing universe
of investors and traders see little or no downside equity risk."
There we have the reason various U.S. stock indices
alternately hit all-time highs. We should not need The Charge of the Light
Brigade to worry investors. The February 21, 2014, issue of Grant's
Interest Rate Observer includes a front-page reminder that pre-tax profits
of U.S. corporations as a percentage of G.D.P. are the highest since records
began in 1946; after 382 of the S&P 500 reported fourth quarter results,
average year-on-year gain on profit has been 10.7%; of the same cohort, revenue
growth has been 0.7%. Presumably, these are not adjusted for price inflation
which is currently raging in the United States, all claims to the
contrary deserving ridicule.
At the September 16, 2008, FOMC meeting, Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke was not blind to financial woes. He declared: "Conditions clearly have
worsened recently, despite the rescue of the GSEs, the latest stressor being the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and other factors such as AIG." He did not stop
there, acknowledging "[a]lmost all financial institutions are facing significant
stress, particularly difficulties in raising capital, and credit quality is
problematic, particularly in residential areas."
Nevertheless, Bernanke was not troubled. He concluded
this discourse by opining: "We may have to wait for some time to get clarity of
the last week or so." As discussed in my first go at the 2008 transcripts, the
FOMC voted to sit still, voting unanimously to keep the fed funds rate at 2.0%.
The reason for such repose is the central-banking fable that finance can be
ignored; its Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model will produce a
monetary solution to address a dyspeptic stock market or a dollar meltdown.
In the same discussion as quoted above, Chairman Ben
said: "We have been debating around this table for quite awhile what the right
indicator of monetary policy is." He mentioned some proposed numbers, but, in
any case: "I think the only answer is that the right measure is contingent on a
model." And: "[Y]ou have to have a model."
(On a different topic, unrelated to the main discussion
here, Simple Ben declared: "The ideal way to deal with moral hazard is a
well-developed structure that gives clear indications.... We have found
ourselves in this episode in a situation in which events are happening quickly,
and we don't have those things in place." He had been Fed chairman for almost
three years yet mentions the Fed's negligence in not addressing Too-Big-to-Fail
banks as if he forgot to order corn-on-the-cob for the Fed's clambake.)
This slapdash approach has not changed, is obviously
unattached to the real world, and will leave Chairman Yellen helpless the next
time markets and financial institutions melt. The otherworldliness of it all is
captured in this discussion itself. The world's financial backstop (our man Ben)
goes on for several pages at a time when Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley could
not get funding from a counterparty. This is quite different than at the FOMC
meeting on September 29, 1998, after Long-Term Capital Management went belly up.
Then-Chairman Alan Greenspan took on a different personality from previous FOMC
meetings. He demanded answers to questions about collateral and leverage that
made him wonder if modern-day bankers knew what they were doing. (He recovered
from this revelatory meeting as soon as LTCM faded, in a sycophantic stunt
before the derivatives lobby that pays him so extravagantly today. See pages
189-190 of Panderer to Power. )
Of course, one wants to know: are we up a creek with
Chairman Janet Yellen in command? Let us compare and contrast two speeches
delivered on February 27, 2014. (I thank Doug Noland, at the Prudent Bear Fund
for his transcription of Dr. Issing's comments in Bundesbankification .)
Otmar Issing, former chief economist of the Bundsebank
and ECB, spoke at the Bundesbank Symposium on Financial Stability, in Frankfurt,
on February 27. Unlike Bernanke and Yellen, Issing thinks financial bubbles have
consequences: "[P]rice stability is not enough. And I think this has dramatic
consequences for the conduct of monetary policy. For me, the implication is very
clear: policy which relies on a forecast (model) based on a real economy only
without a financial sector - without taking into account money and Credit in a
sensible way - is not anymore state of the art." Was it ever? Possibly when 59% of American profits
came from manufacturing and 9% from finance. That was in 1950.
Issing never made headway during the mortgage madness:
"I'm reminded of many, many meetings here or especially in the U.S. with my
friends from the Fed. Their reaction was absolutely clear: when I referred to a
potential bubble in real estate, what I heard always was 'never in the last 50
years have real estate prices fallen on a nationwide aspect.' For me, this was
not a comfort."
He did not stand a chance of making headway with
Bernanke and Yellen in 2006 and 2007: "[T]heir reaction to my critique or
argument was very relaxed: 'In the meantime, we have had much higher GDP, higher
employment, more houses, etc. So compared to the cost of raising interest rates
would be much too high - much too high.' I have never seen so far the comparison
of the high cost of the mess we are in if we take this 'risk management'
approach."
Issing addressed the hostile stupidity of the academics
in charge: "I learn that we're allowed to talk of Bubbles now, which was out of
the question for a long time in research - "the buildup of Bubbles goes very
slowly - softly - but the collapse goes very fast. So it's obvious that that the
[central] bank should react in a decisive way one prices collapse." I think
Issing may not have ventured to the U.S. lately. The "bubbles do not exist"
lobby is pressing its point once again, and, once again, it is from the
universities.
Back in Washington, on the same day, Federal Reserve
Chairman Janet Yellen talked to the Senators. She is lost in space. A few
statements that will not receive interpretation:
"Fiscal policy really has been quite tight and has
imposed a substantial drag on spending in the U.S. economy over the last several
years..."
"I'm slightly surprised that he [Fed Board Governor
Daniel Tarullo] said we are 'nowhere close' [on resolving Too-Big-To-Fail]
because I personally think we've made quite a lot of progress in putting in
place regulations that will make a huge differences [sic] to this...."
"I agree that an environment of low rates ... and we
have had a long period of low interest rates ... can give rise to behavior that
poses threats to financial stability and therefore we need to be looking at that
very carefully and we are doing so in a very thorough way, I
believe."
"Since the financial crisis and the depths of the
recession, substantial progress has been made in restoring the economy to health
and in strengthening the financial system."
Closing on a higher plane:
Shirley Temple died recently. There have been many
accolades but I don't know if the tributes have discussed her admirable
character. She serves as a model for children and adults alike.
Her talent was described by Will
Friedwald in the Wall Street Journal: "The most obvious thing to
remember Shirley Temple for - a point so overwhelming that it barely needs to be
stated - is that she was the greatest child star in the history of not just the
movies but all of popular culture. No other youngster so dominated the box
office and no other individual, other than Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, did
more to deliver both Republicans and Democrats alike from the Great Depression.
But what isn't said often enough about Shirley Temple Black is that when you
compare her to the many dancing ladies in the movies who couldn't really sing
(Ginger Rogers, Rita Hayworth, Cyd Charisse) and those terrific singers in films
who danced merely passably (Judy Garland, Doris Day), Temple emerges as the
major female triple-threat of her era and since. She was a singer of uncommon
ability, capable of putting a song over with the best of them in an age when the
competition was Al Jolson and Bing Crosby; a dancer worthy of comparison with
Fred Astaire, Gene Kelly and even her longtime costar, the great
African-American tap dancer Bill "Bojangles" Robinson; and an actress who could
break your heart just by looking at you."
She was born with talent; it was her unalloyed
resolution that made her an exceptional person. Each morning when she showed up
on the set, she knew her lines, her steps, and her songs. This five, six, and
seven-year-old girl was angry, joyful, or remorseful when the shooting started.
The studio did not require second takes on Shirley Temple's account. It was said
her mother pushed her into show business, but such strength is a habit that
comes from within. She could have demanded the concessions movie stars are noted
for exacting. She never did. Her talent could never have achieved the praise
bestowed by Will Friedwald without habits "rooted deep in the whole personality.
They have to be cultivated like any other habit, over a long period of time, by
experience." (Flannery O'Connor) Few can match her industry, but, as was said
above, she is a model of character.
The actress Louise Brooks wrote: "Anyone who has achieved excellence knows it comes as a result of ceaseless concentration."