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Tuesday, October 1, 2013

Hall of Fame

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession  (McGraw-Hill, 2009) and "The Coming Collapse of the Municipal Bond Market" (Aucontrarian.com, 2009)

Refreshing was the questioning of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke by Congressman Scott Garrett from New Jersey in "Shooting Stars." We can hope his influence may spread.

Not to be forgotten are retired legislators, who did their best. Following is the lashing from Senator Jim Bunning to Chairman Ben S. Bernanke at his re-fossilization hearing on December 3, 2009, for a second term as Fed chairman.

Right off the bat it was a pleasure not to hear Bunning thank the Chairman for saving the world during the financial crisis of 2008. Most of the other senators groveled. ("I believe you are the right leader for this moment in the nation's economic history and I believe your reappointment sends the right signal to markets," - Senator Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, said during his opening statement. - CNNMoney]

But, Senator Bunning developed the habit of going straight for the Adam's apple at a young age. Elected to Baseball's Hall of Fame, the right-handed pitcher won 224 games and hit more batters than all but 10 pitchers in the history of baseball.

Extraordinary is not so much what he says, which is true, but that, four years later, there is such a wall of silence, a stillness, that will not speak of the malignant agglomerations swollen to proportions unimaginable since 2009.

Fear of the end, one might agree, is why trivia substitutes for the truth.

Prepared remarks from Senator Jim Bunning(R-KY)  
Four years ago when you came before the Senate for confirmation to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve, I was the only Senator to vote against you.  In fact, I was the only Senator to even raise serious concerns about you.  I opposed you because I knew you would continue the legacy of Alan Greenspan, and I was right.  But I did not know how right I would be and could not begin to imagine how wrong you would be in the following four years.

The Greenspan legacy on monetary policy was breaking from the Taylor Rule to provide easy money, and thus inflate bubbles. Not only did you continue that policy when you took control of the Fed, but you supported every Greenspan rate decision when you were on the Fed earlier this decade. Sometimes you even wanted to go further and provide even more easy money than Chairman Greenspan. [FOMC transcripts show Bernanke egged Greenspan into cutting rates and Bernanke provided the academic [sic] apparatus for doing so - FJS]  As recently as a letter you sent me two weeks ago, you still refuse to admit Fed actions played any role in inflating the housing bubble despite overwhelming evidence and the consensus of economists to the contrary. [This has not changed in 2013. - FJS] And in your efforts to keep filling the punch bowl, you cranked up the printing press to buy mortgage securities, Treasury securities, commercial paper, and other assets from Wall Street. Those purchases, by the way, led to some nice profits for the Wall Street banks and dealers who sold them to you, and the G.S.E. purchases seem to be illegal since the Federal Reserve Act only allows the purchase of securities backed by the government.

On consumer protection, the Greenspan policy was "don't do it." You went along with his policy before you were Chairman, and continued it after you were promoted. The most glaring example is it took you two years to finally regulate subprime mortgages after Chairman Greenspan did nothing for 12 years. Even then, you only acted after pressure from Congress and after it was clear subprime mortgages were at the heart of the economic meltdown. On other consumer protection issues you only acted as the time approached for your re-nomination to be Fed Chairman.

Alan Greenspan refused to look for bubbles or try to do anything other than create them. Likewise, it is clear from your statements over the last four years that you failed to spot the housing bubble despite many warnings. [Today, in 2013, Bernanke brags that he is lifting house prices to artificial levels. - FJS]

Chairman Greenspan's attitude toward regulating banks was much like his attitude toward consumer protection. Instead of close supervision of the biggest and most dangerous banks, he ignored the growing balance sheets and increasing risk. You did no better. In fact, under your watch every one of the major banks failed or would have failed if you did not bail them out.

On derivatives, Chairman Greenspan and other Clinton Administration officials attacked Brooksley Born when she dared to raise concerns about the growing risks. They succeeded in changing the law to prevent her or anyone else from effectively regulating derivatives. After taking over the Fed, you did not see any need for more substantial regulation of derivatives until it was clear that we were headed to a financial meltdown thanks in part to those products.

The Greenspan policy on transparency was talk a lot, use plenty of numbers, but say nothing. Things were so bad one TV network even tried to guess his thoughts by looking at the briefcase he carried to work. You promised Congress more transparency when you came to the job, and you promised us more transparency when you came begging for TARP. To be fair, you have published some more information than before, but those efforts are inadequate and you still refuse to provide details on the Fed's bailouts last year and on all the toxic waste you have bought.

And Chairman Greenspan sold the Fed's independence to Wall Street through the so-called "Greenspan Put". Whenever Wall Street needed a boost, Alan was there. But you went far beyond that when you bowed to the political pressures of the Bush and Obama administrations and turned the Fed into an arm of the Treasury. Under your watch, the Bernanke Put became a bailout for all large financial institutions, including many foreign banks. And you put the printing presses into overdrive to fund the government's spending and hand out cheap money to your masters on Wall Street, which they use to rake in record profits while ordinary Americans and small businesses can't even get loans for their everyday needs.

Now, I want to read you a quote, Mr. Green-, Mr. Bernanke [laughter, including a smug, patronizing, chortle from Mr. Green-anke - FJS]. That was a Freudian slip, believe me. :"I believe that the tools available to the banking agencies, including the ability to require adequate capital and an effective bank receivership process are sufficient to allow the agencies to minimize the systemic risks associated with large banks.  Moreover, the agencies have made clear that no bank is too-big-too-fail, so that bank management, shareholders, and un-insured debt holders understand that they will not escape the consequences of excessive risk-taking.  In short, although vigilance is necessary, I believe the systemic risk inherent in the banking system is well-managed and well-controlled."

That should sound familiar, since it was part of your response to a question I asked about the systemic risk of large financial institutions at your last confirmation hearing.  I'm going to ask that the full question and answer be included in today's hearing record.

Now, if that statement was true and you had acted according to it, I might be supporting your nomination today. But since then, you have decided that just about every large bank, investment bank, insurance company, and even some industrial companies are too big to fail. Rather than making management, shareholders, and debt holders feel the consequences of their risk-taking, you bailed them out. In short, you are the definition of moral hazard.    

Instead of taking that money and lending to consumers and cleaning up their balance sheets, the banks started to pocket record profits and pay out billions of dollars in bonuses. Because you bowed to pressure from the banks and refused to resolve them or force them to clean up their balance sheets and clean out the management, you have created zombie banks that are only enriching their traders and executives. You are repeating the mistakes of Japan in the 1990s on a much larger scale, while sowing the seeds for the next bubble. In the same letter where you refused to admit any responsibility for inflating the housing bubble, you also admitted that you do not have an exit strategy for all the money you have printed and securities you have bought. [This has not changed. Simple Ben, testifying, July 17, 2013: "If we were to tighten (monetary) policy, the economy would tank." - FJS] That sounds to me like you intend to keep propping up the banks for as long as they want.

Even if all that were not true, the A.I.G. bailout alone is reason enough to send you back to Princeton. First you told us A.I.G. and its creditors had to be bailed out because they posed a systemic risk, largely because of the credit default swaps portfolio. Those credit default swaps, by the way, are over the counter derivatives that the Fed did not want regulated. Well, according to the TARP Inspector General, it turns out the Fed was not concerned about the financial condition of the credit default swaps partners when you decided to pay them off at par. In fact, the Inspector General makes it clear that no serious efforts were made to get the partners to take haircuts, and one bank's offer to take a haircut, and you declined it. I can only think of two possible reasons you would not make then-New York Fed President Geithner try to save the taxpayers some money by seriously negotiating or at least take up U.B.S. on their offer of a haircut. Sadly, those two reasons are incompetence or a desire to secretly funnel more money to a few select firms, most notably Goldman Sachs [Goldman Sachs Chairman Lloyd Blankfein testified he was never asked to take a haircut - FJS], Merrill Lynch, and a handful of large European banks. I also cannot understand why you did not seek European government contributions to this bailout of their banking system.

From monetary policy to regulation, consumer protection, transparency, and independence, your time as Fed Chairman has been a failure. You stated time and again during the housing bubble that there was no bubble. After the bubble burst, you repeatedly claimed the fallout would be small. And you clearly did not spot the systemic risks that you claim the Fed was supposed to be looking out for.

Where I come from we punish failure, not reward it. That is certainly the way it was when I played baseball, and the way it is all across America, presently.  Judging by the current Treasury Secretary, some may think Washington does reward failure, but that should not be the case.  I will do everything I can to stop your nomination and drag out the process as long as possible.  We must put an end to your and the Fed's failures, and there is no better time than now. Your Fed has become the Creature from Jekyll Island.

[End]

Part of Bernanke's response: "Let me just correct one point.... We absolutely believed that AIG's failure would be an enormous systemic risk and would have imposed enormous damage, not just on the financial system, and this is the key point, on the entire U.S. economy and on every American."

If this was true - on the September 2008 day when Bernanke & Co. nationalized AIG - then, no one present understood the difference between a holding company and an operating company. See "The Professor Who Did NOT Save the World", and "David Boies v. Citizen Ben S. Bernanke". If Chairman Bernanke really was that detached from how businesses operate in September 2008, he apparently had no one around who told him the difference by December 2009.


Alternatively, the Fed chairman operates on the Big Lie Theorem, which, if so, is working like a charm and he's not a dumb as he sounds. 

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Communications

Frederick J. Sheehan is the author of Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession  (McGraw-Hill, 2009) and "The Coming Collapse of the Municipal Bond Market" (Aucontrarian.com, 2009)
            Jacques Barzun, who died last week at the age of 104, is known to most Americans, where he is still known at all, for one statement: "Whoever wants to know the heart and mind of America had better learn baseball..." Rarely is his explanation discussed. He saw a combination that was uniquely American: teamwork and technique. Boosters and critics of GDP growth as an end in itself should immediately recognize this truth. Barzun's observation helps explain why Americans were uniquely drawn to stock market technology bubbles. ("Were" - such a distinction between Americans and the rest of the world may have passed.)

Today's bubble-builders root for Apple's ascension to a $1 trillion market capitalization. Comparisons have been drawn to Cisco and Microsoft. But who remembers the post-Sputnik technology boom and bust in 1958? Or the bowling binge in 1962? That was whipped up by the introduction of the automatic-ball-return machine. Americans would be more efficient bowlers, spend, accelerate, and multiply, or some such New Economics interpretation. Bowl-Mor Corporation fell from $51 to $3-7/8; Fairlanes Inc., from $12-3/8 to $4-3/4; Major League Bowling, from $14-1/4 to 5/8; Sports Arenas Inc., from $14-1/2 to $1-1/8.

As to the application of technology, the October 31, 2012, King Report gathered bulletins from the embers: "Power could be restored in Manhattan and Brooklyn within four days, but other boroughs and Westchester County could be without electricity for a week." "[C]ell phone coverage is down as users in Manhattan battle signal failures. Many people are virtually cut off [sic - they are either cut off are they aren't - FJS] and have no way of contacting friends or family or calling for help if there are further emergencies." "A call to FEMA's news desk" found "even they didn't have any non-Internet information readily available beyond suggestions that people call 911 in an emergency."

Investors should watch this development closely: Consumers have dropped non-cell phones, declaring there is no need for Ma Bell's relic. However, this decision is often a means to cut costs. Lifting the veil on falling corporate revenues, many are reductions of spending on, if not formerly "necessities," objects and services that were not consciously considered an "expense." Cell phone or TIVO charges were not matters to ponder.

FEMA's response to those in need: "Well, those people who have a laptop with a little battery life in it can try that way. Otherwise, you're right."

Most markets, including the New York Stock Exchange, were closed Monday and Tuesday, October 29 and 30. The New York Stock Exchange's "main data center for U.S. markets is in Mahwah, New Jersey." It has no remote back up center. After 9/11, we heard: "just-in-case will replace just-in-time." This was specifically directed at the exchanges in New York. October 31 is the last day of the month and the last day of the year for most mutual funds. (Bonuses and retention are swayed by November 1 through October 31 performance). A breakdown at Rahway could have produced untold gains to the swift and the clever, but the exchanges are public now, and precautionary expenses are not accretive to NYSE shareholders.

The presidential election is less than a week away. The clear winners are political opinion makers. Now, no matter what they predicted and no matter who wins, consultants can blame poor forecasts on Americans subjected to a cone of silence rather than the incessant roar of electronic communications.

                                                                                                                                    Nevertheless, technology gadgets are dominant. Yet, in finance, knowledge is regressing. Is it also possible "just-in-time instead of just-in-case" has left us vulnerable, trusting our lives to an i-thing? Electronic communications betray shaky foundations and gee-whiz faith in spreadsheets and models is built on ether.

            Recent conversations reveal the loss of financial acumen.

            Balance sheets are not taught at business school. There will be exceptions, but it is normal to graduate from a celebrity business school without understanding the relationship between the income statement and balance sheet. This makes for frustrating discussions about corporate valuations within investment firms.

            Related is the ignorance of CEOs and CFOs who go about acquiring and spinning off businesses. It has been brought to these elders' attention that they are making such decisions without an appreciation of (for instance) the value of retained earnings vs. those from acquisitions. It makes no impression on top management that earnings that are neither retained nor paid out in dividends are a house of cards.

            Top business schools still drown students in efficient market theory and the capital asset pricing model. The theory is bogus; to those who still believed, it was shot full of holes in 2008; yet, finance professors who rose and landed astoundingly high-paying corporate directorships are not going to think differently.

From someone who attended a reception at his business school, after cornering two finance professors:

"Are you still teaching CAPM?"

"Yes."
"Of course."

"With a negative risk-free interest rate? How does that work?"

"You move it down....."

"How can you teach it when there's obviously no such thing as a risk-free rate?"

"Because that's what we teach."
"Yes, yes. That's what we teach."

It is also evident there is a new taboo when meeting with top-tier investment firm strategists and analysts. That is the touchy topic of monetary policy. Just try and ask a simple question to often-quoted Wall Street oracles: "Do you think Bernanke's policy is working?"

Silence. A cough or two. Then, one of the top-tier analysts dares speak: "Yes." This is the classic Emperor-who-wears-no-clothes. The financial celebrities cannot bear to either think or talk about it.

            My daughter (age 9) was reading a fictional biography of Anne Boleyn to me. Henry VIII was anxious to produce a male heir. Anne Boleyn was eight-and-a-half months pregnant when she had a miscarriage. Life went on at court as if nothing had changed.

            This called for an explanation: "Wait a second. Henry's court - the whole kingdom - was anticipating Anne was about to produce a male heir. Now, she's obviously no longer pregnant. And nobody says a thing? Nobody mentions it? That doesn't make sense."
            Daughter: "Of course it does. It's the same as when Bernanke and Obama say things that everyone knows aren't true but nobody says it. People don't change that much, Daddy. It will be about the same 500 years from now."

            "Keep reading."